Independence and individualism: Conflated values in farmer cooperation? by Emery, Steven B
 
 
Independence and individualism: Conflated values
in farmer cooperation?
Emery, Steven
DOI:
10.1007/s10460-014-9520-8
License:
Other (please specify with Rights Statement)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Emery, SB 2015, 'Independence and individualism: Conflated values in farmer cooperation?', Agriculture and
Human Values, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 47-61. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-014-9520-8
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
The final publication is available at Springer via: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10460-014-9520-8
Checked September 2015
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
1 
 
Independence and individualism—conflated values in farmer cooperation? 
 
Steven B. Emery 
 
School of Geography, Earth, and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, 
Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, United Kingdom,  
Email: s.emery@bham.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Social scientists have long examined the changing role of the individual, and the 
influence of individualism in social and economic arrangements as well as behavioral decisions. 
With respect to co-operative behavior among farmers, however, the ideology of individualism 
has been little theorized in terms of its relationship to the longstanding virtue of independence. 
This paper explores this relationship by combining analysis of historical literature on the 
agricultural cooperative movement with the accounts of contemporary English farmers. I show 
that the virtue of independence is deployed to justify a variety of cooperative (formal and 
informal) and non-cooperative practices and that, despite apparently alternative interpretations, 
independence is most often conflated with individualistic premises. That conflation, I argue, 
leads farmers to see their neighbors as natural competitors: as those from whom which 
independence must be sought. This has the effect of masking the structural dependencies which 
farmers face (such as lenders and large purchasers) and limits the alternatives available to them 
to realize a view of independence that is maintained, rather than opposed, by interdependent 
collective action. Thus perceived, individualism is an ideological doctrine that succeeds by 
appealing to the virtue of independence, while simultaneously denying its actual realization.  
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Introduction 
 
Social scientists have long examined the changing role of the individual, and the influence of 
individualism in social and economic arrangements as well as behavioral decisions. And while 
individualism has been examined to some extent in terms of cooperative behavior among farmers 
(Blackstock et al. 2006; Gröger 1981; Stofferahn 2004), it has not been critically theorized in 
terms of its relationship to the longstanding virtue of independence. A value in independence has 
often been used to explain the lack of cooperation among (particularly British) farmers (Fearne 
1998; Marsden et al. 1986; May 2012; May and Tate 2011; Spriggs et al. 2000), but little work 
has been undertaken to explore the sociocultural and ideological underpinnings of that concept 
and the dynamic inter-relations between them. Instead of taking independence to be a fixed and 
essential virtue of farmers that inhibits cooperative behavior, in this paper I seek to explore the 
variety of interpretations associated with independence and how it has been influenced by an 
ideological doctrine of individualism.  
I take my lead in this endeavor from the inspirational but largely unheeded rallying cry of 
Raymond Williams who insisted that ―we have to be able to explain, in related terms, both the 
persistence and the historicity of concepts‖ (1973, p. 348). By paying close attention to the 
historical and sociocultural dynamism of important concepts and values, Williams demonstrated 
how they are manipulated and regulated to suit the dominant mode of production (capitalism). 
Moreover, he demonstrated the ideological means by which alternative understandings are 
denied, as dominant interpretations are presented prima facie as the enduring natural order of 
things. I have elsewhere developed this idea to explore the ideological manipulation of a farming 
virtue in beneficent change or improvement and have suggested that the persistence yet 
mutability of important cultural values should be seen as refractions of one another (Emery 
2010). In other words, the cultural importance of particular concepts renders them susceptible to 
manipulation and reconfiguration according to changing situations and changing interests, which, 
in turn, ensures their persistence and continuing salience. Foucault (1976, p. 86) made clear that 
power is exercised most effectively when it masks a considerable part of itself. It is by masking 
the very mutability of important concepts, therefore, that ideology works to impose specific 
interpretations on culturally motivating values and norms of behavior.  
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It should be noted, however, that if concepts are constantly subject to revision then this 
must mean that ideological attempts to impose dominant interpretations are never wholesale nor 
complete (Emery 2010). This allows, therefore, that alternative understandings (although often 
marginalized) that lay challenge to the dominant interpretation continue to be nurtured.  
In this paper it is my aim to examine the farming virtue of independence, and its 
conflation with individualism, in this light. This is achieved by studying cooperative behavior 
and attitudes toward farmer-farmer cooperation. The conflation, I suggest, serves to deny actual 
independence from being realized, since it pits farmer against farmer in the quest for 
independence, and detracts from the possibility of challenging the structural dependencies that 
farmers face by working together. Through the paper I will explore the complex and varying 
interpretations of independence put forth by farmers and commentators on cooperation. Before 
doing that, however, let me make clear what I think independence should mean and why I think 
its conflation with individualism can be regarded as ideological. Individualism places paramount 
value on the individual, opposing notions such as the ―social whole‖ or ―collective good,‖ and 
there is an assumption that individual freedoms can only be guaranteed by the freedom of the 
market (Harvey 2005; Lukes 2006 [1973]). Under such a guise, rational economic self-interest 
serves as the guide to behavior and interdependence in pursuit of collective interests is opposed. 
What I mean by actual independence, in contrast, is a concept that is not opposed by 
interdependence but by dependence (in the sense of subordination) (Goldschmidt 1971, p. 135). 
Moreover, I will argue that interdependence is necessary for farmers in their quest for 
independence from the structures of finance capital and the monopolizing power of large 
purchasers and supermarkets (Marsden et al. 1989). In short, individualism promotes the pursuit 
of self-interest while mystifying collective interests, whereas actual independence requires 
demystification and the pursuit of collective interests. 
Throughout the paper I refer to ―ideology‖ in the specific Marxian sense and apply it to 
individualism according to Lukes (2006 [1973]). Thus I use it principally in relation to capitalist 
ideology that acts as an instrument of power by dominating the popular conscience while 
obscuring the popular interest. Specifically in relation to individualism, Lukes (2006 [1973]) has 
shown how that doctrine succeeded by harnessing the broader societal virtues of liberty and 
equality and framing them within a very specific libertarian and market-based philosophy. It is 
from this perspective that I argue the conflation between individualism and independence to be 
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ideological. To develop this argument it will be necessary to explore the history of the concept of 
independence and cooperative behavior among farmers as well as to explore the varied use of 
independence as a virtue among English farmers today. To that end, the paper combines original 
empirical research as well as insights drawn from the contemporary and historical literature on 
farmer cooperation.  
The empirical data is informed largely by semi-structured interviewing with 33 English 
farmers in three case study locations (Peterborough, East Midlands; Grafton, West Midlands; 
Tamar, Southwest). The case study locations were chosen in areas with an identified need for 
increased farmer collaboration in the delivery of landscape-scale conservation. This was 
principally to inform emergent policy priorities in England and Wales (Lawton et al. 2010) 
which called for a ―step-change‖ toward a more joined-up and landscape-scale approach to 
conservation and maintenance of ecosystem services (for further details of the rationale and the 
sampling procedure see Emery and Franks 2012; McKenzie et al. 2013). The overall approach 
was to examine farmers‘ favorability to joining collaborative agri-environment schemes within 
the context of their existing views on (1) agri-environment schemes, and (2) cooperation with 
other farmers. The material presented in this paper draws on the findings related to the second of 
these contexts. In particular, it explores the relationship between the commonly held value in 
independence among farmers and their views on agricultural cooperation. My own longer-term 
ethnographic research among English farmers had revealed the pervasiveness of this value 
(Emery 2010), and an initial pilot study for the project revealed that ―independence‖ was often 
cited as an impediment to cooperation. Thus the research sought to explore the nature of this 
value and how it influenced farmers‘ views towards, and their involvement in, a variety of types 
of cooperative behavior (ad-hoc reciprocity, local arrangements for cooperation in production, 
and buying/selling groups). During interviewing farmers would be asked if they valued their 
independence, and this line of questioning would be followed-up and opened up using the 
principles of ―active‖ interviewing (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) to explore how they interpreted 
it, where they thought it came from, and how it affected cooperation between farmers.  
By farm size the sample comprised of 42% large farms (> 200 ha), 27% medium-sized 
farms (100–200 ha) and 30% small farms (<100 ha). By type of farming it comprised of 42% 
arable farms, 31% livestock/dairy, and 27% mixed arable and livestock. These figures, however, 
show marked regional differentiation: In Peterborough, farms were wholly arable and modally 
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large in size; in Grafton there was an even mix of arable and livestock farms of modally medium 
size, and; in Tamar farms were principally livestock and modally small in size. While regional 
and structural differences between interviewees offers one approach to examine differences in 
favorability toward cooperation, my approach in this paper is not to distinguish farmers along 
such structural lines, except where such distinctions contribute to the analysis of the value in 
independence. For the emphasis here is not, per se, to explore the full range of factors that do, or 
do not influence cooperative attitudes and practices. It is to focus qualitatively on the widespread 
value in independence and to interpret its more subtly nuanced complexities and contradictions. 
Furthermore, when working with small samples and with farms that each have their own unique 
combination of characteristics, it can be difficult, and even misleading, to try and generalize or to 
interpret responses according to farmer ―types‖ (Emery 2010; Siebert et al. 2006). 
With this paper I hope to make three principal contributions. First, following Williams‘ 
lead, I hope to demonstrate the importance of an historical and empirical focus on particular 
concepts and values for understanding the workings and effects of ideology in agricultural (and 
other) contexts. More particularly it contributes to my own broader project of demonstrating how 
ideology works by re-interpreting and monopolizing long-standing and culturally important 
values within farming communities (Emery 2014 in press, 2010).
1
 Secondly, by shedding light 
on the implications of the conflation between independence and individualism, I hope to 
encourage farmers (and those working with them) to consider how they might conceive of 
independence differently and, in doing so, subject the normative barriers to farmer-farmer 
cooperation to critical reflection. Thirdly, and related to the second point, the paper contributes 
to the wider literature on collective approaches to farmer autonomy, such as the extensive body 
of work on food sovereignty (Desmarais 2002; Pimbert 2008; Wittman et al. 2010) and the van 
der Ploeg-inspired work on ―repeasantization‖ and community-led resistance to globalization and 
liberalized food markets (Schneider and Niederle 2010; Van der Ploeg 2008).  
In the following sections I present a brief introduction to the literature on farmer 
cooperation and independence, as well as to the relevant theories of individualism and ideology. 
                                                 
1
 It is important to stress that this work does not deny the ability of farmers to challenge 
dominant interpretations. Indeed, it argues that important values are constantly being negotiated 
in the process of everyday social interaction. 
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My argument is then substantiated through the presentation of empirical and secondary data, 
before reflecting and drawing conclusions. 
 
 
Cooperation and independence among British farmers 
 
Recent work has explored the sociocultural contexts of farmer independence or autonomy (Niska 
et al. 2012; Stock and Forney forthcoming), of farmer cooperation (Sutherland and Burton 2011), 
and the relationship between them (Emery and Franks 2012). This relationship has also been 
more frequently posited, almost assumed, in much of the wider literature on farmer cooperation 
and cooperatives (Fearne 1998; Marsden et al. 1986; May 2012; May and Tate 2011; Spriggs et 
al. 2000). Thus far however, it has been taken for granted that a value in independence is an 
impediment toward cooperative behavior. But is this necessarily so? What is the nature of the 
relationship between independence and cooperative behavior? And just what exactly does a 
value in independence entail? How, moreover, do the social, cultural, environmental, and 
ideological contexts—and their changeability—interact with this value? I hope to address at least 
some of these questions (and at the very least to emphasize the importance and necessity of 
asking them in the first place) as the paper progresses. Before that, this section has the more 
modest aim of examining the origins and development of independence and cooperative behavior 
among British farmers. 
 
 
Farmer cooperation 
 
―The British farmer is by habit and prejudice averse to cooperation‖ (Rew 1913, p.115). 
 
In contrast to more modern and formal understandings of agricultural cooperation, the oldest 
form of cooperation between farmers has been reported as ancient and informal, consisting 
primarily of neighborly help (Sargent 1982; Smith 1961). Moreover, Morley (1975, p. 125) 
suggests that farmers are as renowned for ―the practice of good neighborliness and mutual help 
in emergencies … as they are for their independence in normal times.‖ This immediately points 
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to a contradiction in perfunctory understandings about cooperation and independence. For if, as 
the quote introducing this section suggests, farmers are averse to cooperation, then how can they 
also be renowned for being neighborly co-operators? Morley, in the above quote hints at a 
distinction between attitudes to formal cooperation during ―normal‖ times, and neighborly 
behavior on infrequent ―emergency‖ occasions. I will return to this question as I delve deeper 
into interpretations of independence and its relationship with different cooperative practices 
through analysis of the empirical material. Such archaic and social associations may have their 
roots in, or have been more prevalent during, older systems of land organization such as the 
mediaeval Open Field system prior to the Enclosures of the 14th–19th centuries (Sargent 1982). 
Prior to the establishment of the formal cooperative movement sit a range of other farmer 
associations, the most prevalent of which were the farmers‘ clubs (Pretty 1991; Rew 1913; 
Warman 1922). Farmer groups and clubs were common in the late 18th and early 19th centuries 
and seem to have run contemporaneously and congruently with informal cooperative behavior, 
but became less prevalent and appear less companionable with modern formal cooperatives. 
They often met in public houses, were formed by farmers themselves, provided a simple form of 
cooperative insurance and provided a space for farmers to meet, share knowledge, and award 
prizes (Pretty 1991; Warman 1922). They are recorded as a category of ―social and educational‖ 
combination by Rew alongside ―political‖ and ―commercial‖ categories (Rew 1913, p. 95). 
Interestingly, in more contemporary categorizations of cooperation the emphasis is only on sub-
types of ―commercial cooperation‖ and the significance of the political and social categories 
appears to have diminished.
2
 
                                                 
2
 Rew shows that the farmers‘ clubs were often perceived to be associations of intemperance and 
ill-repute but argues that they played an important social function. Rew cites Mr. Clare Sewell 
Read in 1896 on the loss of the market dinner/tea: ―I can remember when 50 or 60 farmers used 
to sit down at a hotel in Norwich, at three o‘clock, and never think of getting up until five. The 
result was that during these two hours there was an immense amount of information imparted, 
and a confederation and co-operation resulted among those jolly men which really does not exist 
now‖ (Rew 1913: 96–97). One can imagine that the demise of this potentially subversive space, 
was facilitated by the moral aspersions cast against it. 
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The beginning of formal cooperation in Britain is usually attributed to the establishment of 
the Agricultural and Horticultural Society in 1867 (Morley 1975; Sargent 1982). The stated 
objective of agricultural cooperatives was: 
 
... to provide its members with a commercial service for the promotion of their 
economic interests, which will operate at the lowest cost consistent with the quality, 
maintenance, and improvement of the service, and remain under producers‘ control. 
(Morley 1975, p. 60) 
 
The three principal types of formal cooperation that emerged are: (1) cooperative purchase; 
(2) cooperative distribution and sale; and (3) co-operative production. While commercial and 
economic interests are seen to underlie the motives for agricultural cooperation, Worsley (1971, 
p. 2) maintains that it has always also been some way connected with the wider social ideals of 
the cooperative movement. In particular, the movement sought to institutionalize altruism and, 
although always in tension, to limit self-interest. Since its inception formal cooperation has 
waxed and waned in the United Kingdom as conditioned by (among others) changes in 
government, the impact of war, changes in legislation, the varying effectiveness of the official 
cooperative associations and federations, and European integration into the Common Market and 
the Common Agricultural Policy (see Sargent 1982). Nevertheless, throughout these changes 
agricultural cooperation in the UK has remained of consistently lower significance to the sector 
than in other European countries (Sargent 1982). In 2008 there were a reported 450 agricultural 
cooperatives in the UK with a combined turnover of £4.5 billion (approximately €5.5 billion) 
(Cooperatives UK 2012). In the same year this compares with 3,000 cooperatives in France with 
a turnover of €80 billion; 2,994 cooperatives in Germany with a turnover of €44.5 billion; and, 
150 cooperatives in Ireland with a turnover of €12.6 billion (Cogeca 2010). One possible reason 
for the differences across Europe is that the UK has traditionally had larger farm holdings and 
has sought to achieve economies of scale through amalgamation of holdings and increasing farm 
size, rather than through pooling the resources of smaller family farms (Morley 1975). As I will 
show, however, although cooperatives were often espoused as a means of protecting the smaller 
farmer, it has not necessarily been the case in the UK that smaller farmers have been the 
principal beneficiaries of formal agricultural cooperation. 
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Of the three principal types of formal cooperative, the vast majority are for purchase and 
sale, with very few cooperatives established by farmers to physically pool their work and 
resources in production. This might be because such arrangements have remained largely 
informal and work best on a reciprocal one-to-one, dyadic basis (Henrich and Henrich 2007; 
Sutherland and Burton 2011). Henrich and Henrich (2007, p. 63), talking about cooperation 
generally, and Sutherland and Burton (2011, p. 245), talking specifically about farmers, highlight 
the importance of reputation in informal reciprocal relationships. The former propose that 
cooperating at a loss can be an important way to enhance reputation and make the accrual of 
benefits from future cooperation more likely. The latter, meanwhile, suggest that a farmer with a 
reputation as a ―good farmer,‖ in a general sense, is also more likely to be cooperated with by 
other farmers. What happens, however, if a virtue in independence is wrapped up with notions of 
the good farmer (Emery and Franks 2012), and the farmer who seeks to cooperate, or needs to 
cooperate, is somehow seen as publicly admitting his or her failure to uphold this ideal of 
autonomy? In later analyzing the empirical material I will seek to reconcile this apparent 
contradiction as the mutability of interpretation of the independence virtue is explored further 
through particular reference to cooperation in production. 
 
 
The virtue of independence 
 
Scholars of rural life have long made an association between farming, a value in independence 
and its potential affect on farming behaviors (Emery and Franks 2012; Gasson 1973; Ilbery 
1983; Stock and Forney forthcoming; Sullivan et al. 1996; Sutherland and Burton 2011). The 
reasons for this association, however, have been less explored. There is a tentative suggestion of 
a rather materialist interpretation, which posits that the value is necessitated by the isolated 
actualities of farming and patterns of settlement and as an adjustment to environmental 
conditions. Referring to a value in independence among pastoralists in Africa, Goldschmidt 
(1971, p. 136) argues that it is ―not merely a matter of personal choice, but is necessitated by 
environmental circumstances.‖ When considering the lack of cooperation and the independence 
of British farmers, meanwhile, Rew (1913, p. 97) also hints at a circumstantial root: ―the farmer, 
by the nature of his calling, is too much alone—too constantly isolated.‖ This isolation, then, 
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may have privileged farmers that were very practically able to do things for themselves. Emery 
and Franks (2012) have also proposed a combined cultural/pragmatic motive for independence 
that is closely associated with the practically necessary and culturally valued concept of 
timeliness. Timeliness relates to the necessity in farming to be able to act quickly according to 
prevalent uncertainties and, in particular, to the vagaries of the weather. Emery and Franks 
(2012, p. 228) also propose that a value in independence could be culturally self-reinforcing as it 
prevents the exploration among farmers of mutually beneficial solutions by virtue of a fear of 
being seen to contravene the normative ideal of the independent farmer. While Stock and Forney 
(forthcoming), propose a certain commonality in a value in autonomy among farmers, they also 
demonstrate, through an exploration of the values and motives of farmers in New Zealand and 
Switzerland, the plasticity in understanding and application of that value. In contrasting the 
interpretations of sheep and dairy farmers, for instance, they argue that the opposition in their 
interpretations of autonomy ―show that in different contexts, with different farming practices and 
systems, the ideal of liberty in the work is deeply rooted in farmers‘ subjectivity ... [which] is 
coevolutionary with existing structures and contexts‖ (Stock and Forney forthcoming). I will 
later explore this interpretability and consider its significance in terms of ideology and 
cooperative behavior. Prior to that, it is necessary to briefly introduce individualism and its 
sociocultural and historical development and implications. 
 
 
Individualism and ideology 
 
Just as the ideal of independence is mutable and open to interpretation it is important to point out 
that so too is individualism a concept incorporating a multiplicity of interpretations and 
connotations (Lukes 2006 [1973]; Weber 1930). For my purposes here, however, there are two 
important elements to draw out. The first is the historical and contemporary relationship of a 
value in the individual to the organization of society, while the second is the ideological 
underpinnings of the various doctrines of individualism. 
In the anthropological literature the most extensive exposition of individualism has been 
provided by Dumont (1986). It is the dialectic relationship between the elemental individual and 
the ideal individual that Dumont presents as central to a historical relationship between 
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individualism and societal organization: ―When we speak of man as an individual, we designate 
two concepts at once: an object out there, and a value‖ (Dumont 1986, p. 25). Dumont contrasts 
individualism, placing paramount value on the individual, with holism, which places paramount 
value in society as whole. He develops his argument in opposition to, among others, the social 
evolutionary theory of Hobbes and Rousseau. Dumont maintains an evolutionary interpretation, 
however, but this is presented in the direct reverse of Hobbes and Rousseau. Hobbes and 
Rousseau, Dumont shows, both present an evolutionary transition from ―man of nature‖ to 
―political man‖ through the development of the social contract. Both of their views (although 
apparently opposing each other), he argues, represent a transition from individualistic premises 
to anti-individualist conclusions as they represent the ―welding into a social or political body [of] 
people who think of themselves as individuals‖ (Dumont 1986, p. 86). In contrast, the transition 
between ―non-modern‖ and ―modern‖ societies presented by Dumont is one of a shift from an 
idea of the ―outworldly individual‖ to the ―inworldly individual.‖ Hence, in ―non-modern‖ 
societies the individual can only exist as an outcast from society, whereas in ―modern societies‖ 
individualism is the cardinal value that holds society together. In contrast to Hobbes and 
Rousseau, therefore: ―far from their being incompatibility between individual development and 
service to the social whole, it is ‗in and for the whole‘ that the individual develops‖ (Dumont 
1986, p. 135). Dumont traces this shift from the outworldly to the inworldy individual through 
the incarnation of a value in individualism through the rise of Christianity and culminating in 
Calvin‘s theocracy, by which time ―the individualist value rules without restriction or limitation‖ 
(Dumont 1986, p. 53, emphasis in original). Individualism thus becomes a value of modern 
society rather than one that is opposed to society as such (Bauman 2001; Elias 1991). 
Macfarlane (1978), referring specifically to the much-studied English individualism, 
presents historical evidence to suggest that its origins go back at least as far as the 13th century. 
He uses this evidence to challenge eminent theorists such as Marx, Weber, and Polanyi who 
argued that the rise of individualism was associated with the reorganization of society in the 
16th–17th centuries and, in particular, with the rise of capitalism. By studying landholding, 
inheritance and kinship systems Macfarlane presents individualism as something essentially 
English: ―within the recorded period covered by our documents, it is not possible to find a time 
when an Englishman did not stand alone‖ (Macfarlane 1978, p. 269). The corollary of 
Macfarlane‘s interpretation is to refute the arguments for a ―Great Transformation‖ (Polanyi 
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1945) at the end of the middle ages and to suggest that those changes were in some way a 
consequence of this pre-existing English predisposition: ―Individualism, however defined, 
predates sixteenth-century changes and can be said to shape them all‖ (Macfarlane 1978, p. 269). 
Riches (2000) presents a rather more nuanced look at the relationship between egalitarian 
values and individualist practices among Inuit hunter-gatherers and Western New Age societies. 
He argues that egalitarian values are manifest at the cosmological level, while unfettered selfish 
action is manifest at the level of individual strategy. Moreover, he argues that rather than being 
contradictory, the selfish action is itself legitimated by the egalitarian cosmology (Riches 2000, 
pp. 676–677). This is achieved, he argues, through the concept of the ―holistic person‖ that 
―provides an account of human propensities, such that action (reflecting autonomy) discrepant 
with the collective value (equality of outcome) is deemed not to be so‖ (Riches 2000, p. 677). 
Without elaborating on Riches‘ evidence, the important point to draw out is that individualist 
practices and egalitarian or holistic values need not be mutually exclusive (but can instead by 
mutually constitutive). Implicit in this argument, therefore, is a suggestion that it may not be so 
straightforward to detect a marked or even gradual transition from holism to individualism (cf. 
Dumont) and, moreover, that evidence of individualist practices does not necessarily serve as 
evidence for individualist cosmology (cf. Macfarlane). Might it be the case, for instance, that 
Macfarlane‘s evidence for individualism is merely a manifestation of individual practices that 
remain incorporated and legitimated within a non-individualistic cosmology? As part of his 
evidence for the longevity of individualism Macfarlane draws on the remarks of foreign visitors 
to England between 1497 and 1600. He (rather casually) notes that these visitors discussed the 
―independence, individuality, and freedom of the English‖ (Macfarlane 1978, p. 262). But are 
independence, freedom, and even individuality to be seen as evidence for a doctrine of 
individualism, or might they instead represent extant values wholly compatible with holistic 
society? Moreover, is Macfarlane‘s conflation of these terms with individualism itself a 
reflection of the work of ideology, whereby existing cultural values are made to appear 
synonymous with newer and more repressive interpretations (Emery 2010, p. 211)? It might be 
less straightforward to suggest, therefore, that such an ideology cannot be aligned to the rise of 
capitalism in the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Taking individuality as a brief example, this is a term according to Cohen (1994, p. 168) 
that is ―ideologically neutral … and … therefore quite different from individualism.‖ It is 
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associated with notions of individual uniqueness, originality, and self-realization (Lukes 2006 
[1973], p. 30), which were paradoxically suppressed by individualism. For instance in late 20th 
century Conservative Britain which at the same time as espousing personal responsibilities and 
individual freedoms simultaneously sought to homogenize and reign-in ―the self-conscious, self-
directing idiosyncratic individual who resisted conformity‖ (Cohen 1994, p. 172).3 The argument 
I am developing, therefore, is that individualism is not synonymous with independence, with 
freedom, or with individuality, but it is the work of ideology to make them appear so. Steven 
Lukes‘ (2006 [1973]) short book Individualism has been instructive in the development of this 
argument, and his ideas shall be returned to in the concluding section as the empirical and 
historical material presented in the following section is reflected upon. 
 
 
Individualism and independence in cooperative practices among farmers 
 
The motives for formal cooperation—two alternatives 
 
I earlier referred to the work of Worsley (1971), who pointed out that formal agricultural 
cooperation exhibited a certain tension between self-interested motives on the one hand and 
altruistic motives on the other. It is apparent from the literature that the tensions and 
contradictions in agricultural cooperation represent deep-seated competing political ideologies 
and that the early efforts to encourage cooperation approached this task from different 
perspectives.
4
 These alternative perspectives are fascinatingly found in a single book called 
Agricultural cooperation in England and Wales by William Warman published in 1922. 
Fascinating because the author of the foreword to the book (Leslie Scott, then Chairman of the 
                                                 
3
 As Dumont argues, it is not the lack of differences among men that stands individualism apart 
from holism. Instead it is the nature of the relations between men and things. In holistic society, 
he argues, it is the relationship between men that is important, whereas individualism places 
greater emphasis on the relationship between men and things (Dumont 1986, p. 106). 
4
 For an interesting and recent overview of the different discourses motivating agricultural 
cooperation in the US see Stofferahn (2010). 
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Agricultural Organization Society) and William Warman are both extolling the benefits of 
formal agricultural cooperation and seeking to encourage its wider uptake, but they do so from 
very different perspectives that epitomize the political situation in Britain at that time. It is 
important to point out, however, that these differences in perspective are not made explicit in the 
book, which itself serves to obfuscate the alternative motives for formal agricultural cooperation. 
Compare the following extracts: 
 
(i) Some attempts have been made to supercede [sic] the individual farmer and to 
institute factory farms of 20 or 30 thousand acres with the express object of applying 
the principle of combination; but this method cannot be applied to the industry 
without sacrificing what to the nation is an invaluable asset. We want the small 
independent farmer; we have nearly half a million independent farmers … They are 
an independent race, sturdy and not easily swayed by the gusts of popular opinion; in 
fine they constitute a steadying factor in the combination of forces which actuate our 
body politic. An extension of factory farming by big limited liability companies 
would supersede the independent farmer, and we do not want him superseded. But 
the only way that we can keep him and at the same time give him the advantages of 
commercial combination, is by the system of organization in co-operative societies 
…. (Scott 1922, p. viii, emphases added) 
 
(ii) There is a wide difference, both of practice and theory, between agricultural and 
industrial co-operation. Agricultural co-operation is designed with the express object 
of preserving individual initiative—it all ultimately depends on the enterprise of the 
independent farmer. As I see it, the great merit of the system, from a national point of 
view, lies in the very fact that it does preserve the independent farmer and individual 
initiative. In regard to industrial co-operation, it is customary for private traders to 
allege that its object is to supersede individual initiative and to put in its place some 
communistic system of industry and trade… This is no place to join in the 
controversy between the industrial co-operatives and the traders, and I express no 
opinion whatever upon it. But I think it important that the public should realize that 
agricultural co-operation stands completely outside that discussion, and that support 
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of it does not involve taking sides in the industrial controversy. (Scott 1922, pp. ix–x, 
emphases added) 
 
(iii) The smallholder requires to have an independent and self-reliant character. These 
very qualities that make his success, tend to make him reluctant to combine (Warman 
1922, p. 139, emphasis added). 
 
(iv)… in making some observation on the probable future of the [cooperative] 
movement, the first and most important point to make is that the spirit in which it is 
developed will make or mar its success … But the mere word ―co-operation‖ 
suggests that spirit of neighborliness, which is or should be the mark of rural life. It is 
not too much to say that co-operation to be successful should not merely begin with 
neighborliness but should carry the same spirit to its logical conclusion. If the 
farmers of the country decide to combine for business purposes that would be an 
achievement in itself. But one can hardly anticipate that any great loyalty would be 
felt merely for a number of large business undertakings. It is the idea that farmers 
should combine to help each other, which is vital. On the presence or absence of that 
spirit the final position of co-operation depends. (Warman 1922, pp. 172–173, 
emphases added) 
 
Amid the wonderful rhetoric and many points of interest in the above passages I will draw 
out two specific points for my current purpose. The first is the contrasting ideological 
underpinnings to the arguments of Scott and Warman, while the second is that both use and 
misuse/misinterpret the virtue of independence (in different ways) in presenting their arguments. 
Scott presents a view of agricultural co-operation that is founded on self-interest since he 
believes it to preserve ―individual initiative.‖ He is also at pains to stress that it differs from the 
industrial cooperative movement, which has been allied to communism. While maintaining that 
he expresses no opinion on the industrial issue, by clearly separating agricultural cooperation 
from this movement, and by presenting agricultural cooperation as a means of preserving 
individual initiative, he does just that: expresses a forceful opinion. Warman, in contrast, 
promotes the necessity of altruistic motives for formal cooperation and plays down the 
16 
 
significance of self-interest. He hints that cooperation will fail if it proceeds only on the basis of 
individualist ―business purposes,‖ and that success will only be achieved by the extension of the 
―spirit of neighborliness‖ to ―its logical conclusion,‖ with farmers combining ―to help each 
other.‖  
Scott stresses that independence is not only a value to farmers, but that the ‗independent 
farmer‘ is of value to the nation as a whole. In the same breath Scott argues that agricultural 
cooperation is a means of preserving ―the independent farmer and individual initiative.‖ He also 
switches between using ―the individual farmer‖ and ―the independent farmer.‖5 Both of these 
subtle plays with language ensure that Scott not only argues that agricultural cooperation is the 
only way to preserve the independent farmer that ―we‖ all value so highly, but that individualist 
practices are also the only way of preserving ―him‖: that independence and individual initiative 
are one and the same thing. Warman meanwhile, like the assumptions that this paper sets out to 
challenge, suggests that the virtue of independence is an impediment to cooperation among 
farmers. Both Scott and Warman, therefore, use and misuse or misinterpret a virtue in 
independence in pressing their cases. While Scott‘s might be deemed a sinister ideological 
obfuscation between independence and individual initiative, Warman‘s usage is reflective of the 
same general process, since it presents a view of independence and interdependence between 
farmers as opposed. In short, then, both usages suggest that the ideology of Scott is in the 
ascendancy, since independence is seen as something preserved by the type of self-interested 
cooperation envisage by Scott, but something that is seen as oppositional to the type of altruistic 
cooperation envisaged by Warman. My argument is that the opposite should be true. 
 
                                                 
5
 In a different and contemporary context Rossi and Hinrichs (2011, p. 1425) have married both 
individualism and independence in explaining reluctance of US farmers to cooperate: ―Cultural 
values of individualism and beliefs about the importance of farmer independence could make it 
difficult to form and sustain effective co-operative farmer organizations.‖ 
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Contemporary interpretations of independence and their relationship with co-operative behaviors 
among farmers 
 
In this section I aim to demonstrate the pervasiveness of a value in independence among the 
farmers sampled and to provide examples that demonstrate that, despite its pervasiveness, it is 
interpreted in multifarious ways when used to explain co-operative behaviors. As well as farmers 
being asked directly during interview about the extent to which they valued their independence, 
the issue was also raised by the farmers themselves in wider discussions about the barriers to 
cooperation. This is important since it demonstrates that the farmers themselves were making a 
link between a value in independence and its effect on co-operative practices; rather than purely 
being prompted by the questions posed. In presenting empirical material from the interviews I 
use a combination of direct quotes, paraphrasing, and summating/summarizing of commonly 
articulated points. In all cases, the material is drawn from instances where the farmers were 
directly asked about the value in independence and its relationship to co-operation, or where they 
had raised it themselves during the course of the semi-structured interviews. It is important to 
note that farmers were deliberately not provided with a specific definition of what independence 
was taken to mean. This ensured that farmers provided their own interpretation of what it meant 
to them, and worked towards the objective of demonstrating and explaining the plurality of 
interpretations.  
The interviews revealed a widespread confirmation of a value in independence, with 82% 
of the sample stating that their independence is important to them. Both materialist and 
essentialist origins of a value in independence were evident. Several farmers argued that the 
isolation and insularity of farming was the principal cause of the independence virtue and that 
the insular lifestyle could attract a certain type of person that would value his or her 
independence highly. Others, meanwhile, suggested it was something more innate to farmers, as 
either ―bred into‖ them, as ―inbuilt‖ or ―ingrained‖: 
 
It‘s [the value in independence] because of the nature of the way that we‘ve been 
brought up, we do naturally work better on our own and, if I work in a big group, 
I do struggle … [Mixed arable and livestock farmer, Tamar, emphasis added] 
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Essentialist arguments such as these are used to demonstrate the persistence of the virtue 
but they can also be dangerous. This is because they allow historically particular interpretations 
of the virtue (e.g., as individualistic) to appear as ―natural,‖ longstanding, and irrefutable. The 
following examples provide further evidence of a broad association between the value in 
independence and a reluctance to cooperate: 
 
They‘re a very independent breed, small farmers. And by default, if they start 
getting working together, you know, I think that is the biggest obstacle. It‘s a 
state of mind, it comes down to personalities … the whole idea of being a small 
farmer is you are independent. [Arable farmer, Peterborough] 
 
... I value our independence, the only contract we have on the farm is the sheep 
shearer, we do absolutely everything else ourselves because I like to retain my 
independence and don‘t like to rely on someone else coming to do something if I 
can do it myself. [Mixed arable and livestock farmer, Grafton] 
 
[Farmers are] all independent; that‘s why they don‘t work together very well I 
think, you know. [Mixed arable and livestock farmer, Tamar] 
 
If a whole load of you got together and co-operated it would probably be easier, 
but that‘s, it‘s just traditionally how farmers are, [they] are independent really. 
[Arable farmer, Grafton] 
 
As this last example demonstrates, it would be wrong to suggest that farmers are not aware of the 
potential benefits of cooperating and it suggests that a normative value in independence (Emery 
and Franks 2012) acts as a barrier to co-operation, and can therefore be to farmers‘ disadvantage. 
This is well demonstrated by an anecdote relayed by a farmer from Peterborough. The reluctance 
of a group of his neighbors to pool their resources to buy some land meant that they all ended up 
missing out to a larger buyer with greater purchasing power: 
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Res.—farmers are such a stuck-up lot of buggers, they will not cooperate. They‘d 
sooner stick their head in the sand and bury themselves rather than admit that 
they need assistance. 
 
Int.—And where do you think that sort of attitude comes from? 
 
Res.—It‘s ingrained, isn‘t it? It‘s born and bred … They look to me and say, ―I 
wonder what...‖ They do say, ―Well, you‘ve done this and you‘ve done that,‖ and 
I say, ―Well, you know, there‘s nothing to stop you doing it. You‘ve just got to 
pull your fingers out.‖ I mean, we had, I can tell you, we had a case in point. 
There was some land came up for sale three months ago in 11 different lots and 
there was quite a few farmers, small farmers, wanted to buy different fields, and 
the agents had put it in one lot, sealed bids, one lot, and that‘s it, and they 
wouldn‘t split it. My neighbor and I got them together and said, ―Look, if you 
want this land, you‘ve got to put in a joint bid. We‘ll put in a joint bid for you, if 
you like, but you‘ve all got to sit down here and decide what you‘re going to pay 
for it.‖ Some of them were willing to pay silly money for individual fields, but 
would they as hell get together in the end. Now they‘re all moaning because they 
couldn‘t buy it. Well, it‘s their own fault.  
 
While this farmer shows an awareness of the benefits of working together, it should be 
noted that he does not present this argument from a moral socialist (―spirit of co-operation,‖ cf. 
Warman 1922) perspective. His story was one of entrepreneurialism and he had rapidly 
expanded his business without recourse to social conventions. Indeed, when asked if he co-
operates with his neighbors (most of whose farms were considerably smaller than his) he 
quipped that he usually ―buys them out‖ instead. 
In contrast to the frequency with which a lack of co-operation was associated with a 
value in independence, on no occasion did any of the farmers talk explicitly about individualism. 
This might be explained by the fact that farmers were not directly questioned about 
individualism. However, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, many farmers introduced 
the idea of independence themselves, before they had been specifically questioned about it. 
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Moreover, in my longer term ethnographic research among English farmers (Emery 2010) 
individualism was not found to be a common term employed in everyday parlance. Coming 
closest to a direct expression of individualism was one farmer from the Grafton area, who spoke 
about farmers as ―individuals‖ and used this to justify why they do not (and, in his view, should 
not) co-operate. In the following extract co-operation is being discussed during an interview 
where two farmers were present: 
 
Res.—[Farmers will] never co-operate. 
 
Int.—Why not? Why do you think it‘s difficult? 
 
Res.—Well, we‘re all individuals, and that‘s it. You‘re actually competing 
against yourselves as well... 
 
Int.—Against yourselves? 
 
Res.—Well you‘re competing against each other for the same trade aren‘t you … 
 
Int.—So are you involved in any sort of co-operation at all, even on an informal 
or ad hoc basis? 
 
Res.—We grow strawberries for a group and they‘ve got their own agronomist 
and if I do something new on my farm, that agronomist sees it and he tells the 
next one, and he‘s done that in the past which is losing my advantage of growing 
things at different times.  
 
The other farmer present then pointed out that while this might be true for fruit production, grain 
farmers are not in direct competition with their neighbors. This seemed to catch the first farmer 
off-guard momentarily, but he managed to turn the situation of the grain farmer into one of a 
contest against his or her neighbors: 
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Res.—... but you all want, you‘re all facing the same thing ‗cause if that neighbor 
didn‘t have it there‘d be a bit less corn about wouldn‘t there? So the people 
buying it in that area would be a bit nicer to you wouldn‘t they? 
 
So instead of seeing the buyer as the impediment to achieving a better price, and cooperative 
bargaining as a route to securing a better price, this farmer continued to see other farmers as 
direct competitors with whom which any right-minded farmer, should not wish to cooperate.  
In the following three sections I aim to demonstrate that while the value of independence 
is widely held and expressed, its meanings and practical implications (in terms of co-operation) 
are considerably more varied. Moreover, while individualism does not figure prominently in the 
articulations of farmers it can, in many instances, be seen to underlie many discussions around 
independence and co-operation. Indeed, the very fact that it is often conflated with independence, 
while not itself being expressed, demonstrates its ideological workings.  
 
Neighborliness 
The neighborliness of which Warman spoke in the 1920s was still clearly evident among the 
sample of modern English farmers. Neighborliness, or ad-hoc reciprocity as the survey referred 
to it, was the most commonly cited type of cooperation among the entire sample of farmers (with 
58% of all respondents engaged in it). This type of cooperation involved farmers helping each 
other out on an infrequent ―as needs arise‖ or emergency basis and was often limited to a small 
number of strong relationships.
6
 Most typically, such interactions would not involve any 
financial transactions. It was still important, however, that relationships were seen as fair and 
equitable, and where successfully established they often spanned multiple generations. 
Respondents referred to it as a type of insurance, as engagement in informal reciprocal relations 
provides assurances that help will be available from one‘s neighbors when the need arises. 
Despite the common prevalence of neighborly practices among the sample there was a notable 
difference according to farm size. Whereas, respectively, approximately 80% and 90% of small- 
(<100 Ha) and medium- (100-150 Ha) sized farms in the sample actively engaged in informal 
                                                 
6
 Henrich and Henrich (2007) report that in tit-for-tat reciprocal relationships fewer interactants 
are often favored since it allows for easier accounting of past behaviors. 
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ad-hoc reciprocity the same was true for only 30% of large (>250 Ha) farms (also supported by 
Sutherland and Burton 2011, p. 253). 
One farmer from Tamar, in the Southwest of England, pointed out that, although it is 
important to be able to call upon neighbors during emergencies, the value in independence 
among farmers means that they do not tend to engage in neighborly help ―as a matter of course‖ 
but only when ―pushed.‖ When asked about the reasons for a value in independence, he said it 
had just always been there in farming and stems from a ―healthy competition.‖ 
 
Formal cooperative membership 
Despite formal agricultural cooperation being espoused as a means of protecting the small farmer 
(e.g., by the European Commission (Morley 1975, p. 17), and in contrast to the patterns of 
informal reciprocal cooperation in the previous section, the membership of formal cooperatives 
among the sample of farmers was entirely limited to large farm enterprises. Almost a third of 
large farms (>250 Ha) in the sample were involved in formal buying and marketing cooperatives, 
whereas none of the small- and medium-sized farms were similarly involved. In sum, then, this 
suggests that smaller farms are more likely to engage in neighborly informal cooperation, 
whereas larger farms are more likely to engage in formal cooperatives. Moreover, this tends to 
suggest that, contra to Warman‘s aspirations, the spirit of neighborliness among small farmers 
does not seem to translate into membership of formal cooperatives, and that there are alternative 
motives for informal and formal cooperation. Although drawn from only a small sample this 
observation has been supported in the literature (Beal 1954; Gasson 1977; Morley 1975; Nielsen 
Farmers‘ Panel 1963). Gasson (1977) and Beal (1954) suggest that not only is there no 
correlation between informal cooperation and membership of formal cooperatives, but that this is 
particularly pronounced among high status farmers. Beal showed that high status farmers are 
more likely to be members of cooperatives, while Gasson showed a negative correlation between 
high status individuals on the board of directors of formal cooperatives and informal cooperative 
practices: i.e., those farmers responsible for the management and decision-making within the 
cooperative tended to be higher-status farmers and also less likely to engage in informal 
neighborly cooperation (Gasson 1977, p. 114). So what does this suggest about the motives for 
formal cooperation and its relationship with a ―spirit‖ of neighborliness? To illustrate, consider 
one farmer (Howard [pseudonym]) from Grafton in the West Midlands of England who sits on 
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the Committee of the local Crop Marketing Group. Howard does not engage in any informal 
cooperative/reciprocal activities with neighbors and prefers to use contractors for any jobs that 
he cannot do for himself. When I asked about the benefits of cooperation he replied ―you can 
never buy anything cheaper, and you can never sell anything better. I‘m on the Marketing 
Committee … so I‘m in there with another 15 people and we make a decision every month as to 
what proportion and what price we mandate the sales at.‖ Based on the range of responses I had 
heard to this question from other farmers I curiously asked whether he also thinks there are any 
non-financial benefits of cooperation, such as bringing farmers together or strengthening the 
community. ―I think money drives,‖ he replied. Rather than being an apparatus for the mutual 
self-help of the small farmer, therefore, it appears that formal cooperation proceeds largely on 
the basis of rational self-interest and the pursuit of individual economic satisfaction (Smith 1961, 
p. 144). 
 
To share machinery or to use contractors? 
Many of the discussions with farmers on the subject of cooperation focused on the use of 
machinery in production and, in particular, on the relative merits and drawbacks of sharing 
machinery/labor with neighbors vis-à-vis the use of agricultural contractors. Many farmers, like 
Howard from the previous example, preferred to use contractors as they saw being reliant upon 
neighbors as an infringement on their independence and the associated imperative for timeliness 
(Emery and Franks 2012, p. 225):  
 
Int.—Do you engage in any more informal sharing of equipment or labor ? 
 
Res.—It‘s easier to contract. 
 
Int.—Mm. Less of a risk? 
 
Res.—Those unessential jobs can be contracted, the essential ones you do 
yourself, that‘s really what it comes down to. 
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Int.—So why do you think that some people co-operate on machinery rather than 
contract? 
 
Res.—You‘d better go and ask them that! … The difference between a good 
farmer and a bad farmer is about five hours and quite honestly if you can‘t do it 
yourself in that five hours you won‘t do it at the right time, so I think that‘s the 
essential part of it. [Howard, arable farmer, Grafton] 
 
There are a range of reasons why sharing might be favored to contracting and vice versa. Many 
of these reasons are practical. Livestock farmers, for instance, pointed out that they tend to have 
relatively small machines that they use on an almost daily basis, which does not lend itself to 
sharing. Arable farmers, in contrast, require large, expensive machines (such as combine 
harvesters), which might sit idle for much of the year and can therefore be sensibly shared if it is 
possible to coordinate production activities with neighbors. Rather than elaborating the various 
practical constraints on cooperative decision-making I want to focus instead on the varying 
motives for such behaviors and, in particular, their associations with a concept of being ―in 
control‖ or independent.  
It has been suggested that the rising cost of agricultural machinery has influenced the 
likelihood of machinery sharing among farmers. Interestingly, however, there are competing 
interpretations of this relationship. Sutherland and Burton (2011) argue that while others have 
indicated a proliferation of machinery sharing on account of rising costs, their evidence suggests 
the opposite to be true. These alternatives may be consistent, however, if farmers are more 
reluctant to loan out the expensive equipment they own (for fear of damage) on the one hand, but 
at the same time that there are more farmers seeking formalized sharing arrangements as a means 
of spreading costs on the other. Indeed, among the sample of farmers in the current study both 
motives were apparent. Several farmers cited the rising cost of machinery as a reason for more 
cooperation between farmers, whilst others cited the rising cost as a reason for there being less 
cooperation (and more use of contractors) between farmers. This might suggest alternative 
financial motives for alternative types of cooperation (varying levels of formality), but it might 
also be underlain by alternative notions of autonomy. To explore this further I will now briefly 
consider three farmers. 
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Dave, an arable tenant farmer from Grafton, argued that farmers are traditionally 
independent and self-reliant, which acts as an impediment to sharing machinery with neighbors. 
This is because, he argued, ―you are so used to rowing your own boat‖ that it is difficult to start 
having to make decisions with somebody else. Brian, a mixed livestock and arable farmer, also 
from Grafton, meanwhile, said that many farmers in the area had shifted to a share-cropping 
arrangement, whereby all of the production work was undertaken by contractors. This might be 
true, he suggested, for older farmers who, rather than (for instance) letting out their land to other 
farmers, preferred to use contractors. This would allow them to maintain control and decision-
making responsibility for the farm, which is part of the ―lifestyle‖ of the farm that they value and 
want to hold on to. Younger farmers, particularly in the Peterborough area, had also followed 
this route, and tended to pursue other business interests in the time freed up by the use of 
contractors. Thomas, a dairy farmer from Tamar, in contrast said that he had gone into a 
machinery sharing arrangement with a neighbor rather than use contractors because ―we 
generally like to be in control of what we do‖ (emphasis added). This suggests that independence 
is retained by working with others, rather than relying on contractors to undertake the farming 
work. And in terms of the independence virtue, Thomas suggested it comes from being 
―protective of one‘s own‖ and not wanting to be seen as the ―ones who are doing the least well.‖ 
This suggests that a value in independence has some association with farming reputation, and 
that farmers may keep themselves to themselves because of a ―fear of exposure to the potential 
judgment of others‖ (Emery and Franks 2012, p. 228). 
In the above examples it might be possible to pull out a relationship between control and 
independence. There is, however, a distinction between the desire to retain control over decisions 
and the desire to retain control over practices. The farmer that uses contractors gives up some 
control over his/her farm work, whereas the farmer that shares with neighbors gives up some 
control over his/her decisions: you just have to ―think like one big farm‖ said one farmer from 
Grafton who was joint venture farming with two neighbors. The use of contractors tends to 
maintain an individualistic approach and the virtue of independence is used by the farmers to 
explain this preference. And although it might allow a sense of control to be retained, it also 
entails a dependency on others (with interests different to those of the farmer) to carry out the 
actual farm work. The sharing of machinery, however, recognizes the interdependence of 
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farmers and it is particularly interesting that Thomas, in the above example, recognizes that 
independence and interdependence are not mutually exclusive.  
 
 
Individualism and cooperative behaviors 
 
This section has explored the tension between individualist and altruistic motives for various 
types of agricultural cooperation and the interpretations of independence given by farmers and 
others in their explanation or promotion of farming behaviors. It first presented two alternative 
ideological motivations for cooperation which relied on an extension of individualistic 
interpretations of cooperative independence on the one hand (Scott) and an extension of an 
altruistic spirit on the other (Warman). It was already apparent from Warman‘s usage of 
independence—as something opposed to cooperation—that individualistic motives for 
cooperation were in the ascendancy. It is no surprise therefore that the evidence presented in the 
second sub-section suggests that (1) individualistic motives underlie much formal agricultural 
cooperation; (2) it is large, higher status farmers that benefit most from economic cooperatives 
(despite putative contrary claims for the early intentions of agricultural cooperation), and, 
moreover; (3) that such individualist motives are also to be found in the realm of cooperation in 
production and, even, in neighborliness. While the prevalence of neighborliness suggests that 
altruistic practices remain strong among English farmers, an examination of interpretations of 
the virtue of independence suggests that the (misconstrued) values underlying attitudes to such 
behaviors may be less altruistic (cf. Riches 2000). Not only, therefore, were Warman‘s hopes for 
the spirit of neighborliness to be carried through into the realm of formal agricultural cooperation 
not realized but it appears that the opposite was the case. The spirit of individualism evident in 
the formal cooperative movement appears instead to have flown back the other way to ingress 
upon attitudes and motivations toward neighborly practices. This is evidenced, for instance, by 
essentialized interpretations of independence that are at one and the same time seen as an 
impediment to neighborly cooperation and associated with ideas of ―competitiveness‖ or 
protecting reputation. Such essentializing, I have shown, has the effect of masking ideology, 
which works precisely by giving new interpretations to apparently fixed and irrefutable cultural 
values.  
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Moreover, I argue that the principal way that the virtue of independence gets 
misconstrued is through the misrecognition of from whom independence is sought. By seeing 
their neighbors as competitors, or even enemies, English farmers erroneously focus their efforts 
at upholding the important virtue of independence in opposition to their farming peers. This 
simultaneously diverts their attention from more structural/economic forms of dependency and 
prevents the recognition of their mutual interests—of an interdependent interpretation of 
independence—to attain collective independence against such structural forms. For, as several 
farmers who were at a loss with the lack of cooperation were at pains to point out, it is rare that 
your farming neighbors are actually in direct competition with you. The result, therefore, is a 
misconstrued interpretation of independence which may lead to non-cooperative behaviors and 
actions that actually result in greater dependency on higher powers (such as supermarkets and 
processors that monopolize the market and dictate prices to farmers). I illustrate this with the 
thoughts of Philip, one of few remaining small farmers in the Peterborough area, who had seen 
the scale and intensity of farming increase rapidly around him. Between the 1930s and 1960s, he 
argued, farmers used to cooperate ―an awful lot.‖ Then from the 1960s ―people became more 
independent‖ (emphasis added) and wanted their own expensive machinery, which, he pointed 
out ―is where they went wrong economically,‖ because to realize this so-called independence 
(from the need for cooperative practices for instance) ―they borrowed too much‖ and wound up 
in a position of indebtedness and dependency on the banks and lending institutions. An 
individualistic and anti-cooperative interpretation of independence, therefore, ultimately led to a 
loss of financial independence (see Marsden et al. 1989, p. 3).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The prescriptions of economic individualism, while appealing to the values of 
equality and liberty, in fact amount to their denial. (Lukes 2006 [1973], p. 123) 
 
In the terms of Raymond Williams introduced at the outset of this paper, I have attempted to 
explore (at least one facet of) the relationship between the persistence and historicity of the 
virtue of independence. Independence, as a virtue among farmers, has persisted on account of its 
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importance as a guide to practice. It has also persisted, however, because of its mutability and its 
openness to interpretation. This ensures its continuing salience according to changing times and 
changing contexts but it also renders it susceptible to manipulation according to alternative 
interests and ideologies, which may allure precisely because they appeal to the apparent 
longevity, consistency, and irrefutability of the values that are held most dear. This leads, as I 
have attempted to show in this paper, to a complex and rather confusing relationship between 
values and cooperative practices. And on account of this, it has not been straightforward to 
determine whether formal cooperation or neighborly practices maintain or denigrate 
independence (in whatever range of combinations). I have shown, however, that even in 
apparently altruistic practices an individualistic interpretation of independence is used to explain 
motivations. Just like Riches (2000) argued that individualistic practices can be legitimated 
within an egalitarian cosmology, so too can apparently altruistic practices be legitimized 
within—and be constitutive of—an individualistic ideology. If formal and informal practices can 
be justified as retaining ―independence,‖ while at the same time independence is interpreted as 
―natural‖ and ―healthy competition‖ between farmers, then the ideology of individualism is 
upheld by a range of apparently opposing practices and perspectives. Both the blatant synonymy 
between independence and individualism expressed by Scott and the use of an essentialized 
interpretation of independence as an inhibitor to more genuinely altruistic practice (by Warman 
and others) are representative of the same general process. It is common to mistake the 
persistence of a virtue with fixity rather than mutability. But this mistake actually allows new 
(and possibly malignant) interpretations to take hold, and enter the realm of the taken-for-
granted, while going virtually unnoticed and seldom challenged.  
Throughout this paper, and developed along the lines of the quote introducing this 
section, I have put forward an argument that the conflation of independence with individualism 
actually amounts to its denial. Lukes develops this argument through recourse to the broader 
fundamental societal virtues of ―liberty‖ and ―equality,‖ which, he shows, have been ―hijacked 
and harnessed‖ ideologically by connection to individualistic doctrines ―that embody libertarian 
thinking and promote market-favoring policies, and so pre-emptively exclude alternative ways of 
framing issues and asking questions‖ (2006 [1973], p. 9). Independence can be closely associated 
with the idea of liberty and is the kind of ―compelling and seductive‖ ideal that by appealing to 
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our ―institutions and instincts, to our values and our desires‖ can be commandeered ideologically 
to become a dominant way of thought (Harvey 2005, p. 5).  
So if, as I have argued in this paper, independence is misinterpreted, misconstrued or 
manipulated in various guises, and if actual independence is denied by its conflation with 
individualism, then what exactly should actual independence be taken to mean? Just what is it 
that is being denied, and what sort of interpretations and practices are required to uphold this 
actual independence? 
The answers to these questions have been hinted at through the course of the paper, and 
become clearer if the idea of ―actual independence‖ is associated with Lukes‘ interpretation of 
autonomy. Lukes presents autonomy (along with privacy and self-development) as one of the 
three faces of liberty and maintains that it is achieved when an individual ―subjects the pressures 
and norms with which he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation, and forms intentions 
and reaches practical decisions as the result of independent and rational reflection‖ (2006 [1973], 
p. 55). So by taking the taken-for-granted for granted, and by succumbing to the ideological 
interpretations that are offered, an individual may not be autonomous. And by taking 
independence to mean independence from one‘s farming peers, and without subjecting the idea 
of independence to critical examination, autonomy or actual independence is ironically left 
wonting. In the first instance, therefore, achieving actual independence requires that the 
normative ideological underpinnings of that very virtue (and others to boot) are recognized and 
reflected upon. Once the shadow of individualism has been cast off, and it is distinguished from, 
rather than conflated with, independence then other potentialities emerge; independence can be 
interpreted and achieved differently.  
 
The song of the land, the song of rural labor, the song of delight in the many forms of 
life with which we all share our physical world, is too important and too moving to 
be tamely given up, in an embittered betrayal, to the confident enemies of all 
significant and actual independence and renewal. (Williams 1973, p. 325, emphasis 
added) 
 
In Williams‘ rather engaging and poetic prose, actual independence is contingent upon the 
sharing of the physical world in the flows of life and work. Hence, it is through interdependence, 
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rather than in opposition to it, that independence as autonomy can be seen to emerge.
7
 This sort 
of interdependent independence, according to Goldschmidt (1971, p. 137), requires that 
individuals ―maintain collaborative arrangements with their fellows, without coercion or 
subordination to some superior authority.‖ Compared to their continental European counterparts 
English farmers have little recent history of direct political action. The conflation of 
independence with individualism—and the attendant viewing of one‘s actual and metaphorical 
―neighbors‖ as one‘s ―enemies‖—offers just one explanation for this lack of political action and 
the lack of any widespread support for mutually beneficial agricultural cooperation. I believe it 
to be a particularly potent mechanism, however, since what is being denied is farmers‘ autonomy 
over their autonomy: their freedom to transcend the constraining and illusory options that 
ideology proffers. Hence, the practices and relationships through which farmers seek to uphold 
their independence, if left unchecked, can actually increase their dependency on the structural 
and economic forces that impose very real limitations on the everyday rhythms of their work and 
lives (such as supermarkets and lenders) (Marsden et al. 1989). It would be wrong to suppose, 
however, that farmers are simply cultural dupes with no agentive powers to negotiate their own, 
alternative moral positions. If their remonstrations and grievances with structural forms of 
power, however, are not channeled collectively then the power of those grievances to bring about 
effectual changes is significantly diminished. Of course, increased political activism is just one 
possible response to a refined and autonomously informed interpretation of independence. The 
purpose of exposing the mechanisms by which independence and individualism are conflated is 
more than to simply encourage greater political action; it is to open up the array of imaginable 
possibilities (for interpretation and practice) that the recognition of that conflation allows.  
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